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Abstract. The aim of this article is to analyse the determinants of moonlighting in the 
context of falling worker’s wages in Cameroon. From a sample of Cameroonian workers 
with a main job a bivariate structural probit model analysis shows that the participation in 
moonlight jobs is inversely correlated with the level of education and the female gender. But 
it is positively correlated with both the wage of the main job and age. Moonlighting seems 
to play a different role in the transition from working life to retirement in Cameroon 
compared to developed countries. 
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1. Introduction 
n developing countries (D.C.) people rely on various sources of financial 
income. Leibbrand Woolard & Woolard (2000) have empirically shown 
that it is the case in South Africa. Furthermore, Glick (1999) argues that 
in the case of Guinea, financial gains are often completed by extensive 
engagement in domestic production. The situation is likely to be similar in 
other sub-Saharan African countries and in other developing countries. 
This suggests that studies on labour market participation and labour 
supply in developing countries should be initiated from the assumption 
that the practice of moonlighting is the norm and not the exception. Except 
the work of Glick (1999) and Jolifle (2004), this is not however the case in 
the literature of economics. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to 
examine the extent of the practice of moonlighting in the Cameroonian 
context, and to analyse the factors that lead individuals to get moonlight 
jobs. Our interest in the phenomenon of moonlighting in developing 
countries stems from the observation that the real wages of Cameroonian 
workers in the formal sector were cut in January and November 1993. Such 
a drop in real wages raises a number of questions: 
- How do these workers manage to cope on a daily basis? 
- Has their financial standard of living deteriorated accordingly way or 
have the real low wages led workers to increase their working hours in 
their main job or in the moonlight job? 
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- In particular, has the participation of workers with a main job in 
moonlighting increased? 
- Glick (1999) and Joliffe (2004) address some of these questions, but due 
to lack of data, these authors had to use scale models of the moonlight job 
models. Conversely, since the publication of the seminal article by Shishko 
& Rostker (1976), research on moonlight jobs in industrialized countries has 
largely relied on structural forms of models which are usually more 
informative than scale forms of models. This methodological difference is 
mainly due to the problem of observing what individuals earn in 
developing countries when they work in the informal sector. Deaton (1997) 
emphasizes the difficulties encountered in measuring income in developing 
countries. Glick1 (1999) investigates the determinants of women's labour 
supply both in domestic production and on the labour market in Conakry, 
Guinea. His analysis is based on an empirical approach which takes into 
account the joint effect inherent in the decision to allocate time to domestic 
production and to the different production activities of the market. Unlike 
the rural data used in the majority of work, he uses urban data and 
concludes that individual characteristics and household characteristics 
have a great influence on women's time allocation in productive activities. 
"In this research paper, as a continuation of Theisen’s research (2005), we 
suggest, a new orientation to this problem. The suggested method enables 
the estimation of the reduced form of the multiple-use model. To the best of 
our knowledge, except for the work of Theisen (2005), scale models of 
moonlight jobs had not been previously estimated using data from 
developing countries. While Shishko & Rostker (1976) as well as most work 
on moonlight jobs rely on data from developing countries to estimate 
labour supply equations, this paper is limited to the study of participation 
in moonlight jobs. This limitation is mainly due to the availability of data 
and is linked to the above-mentioned problem of measuring income. 
This study focuses exclusively on workers with a main job and a 
moonlight job. Previous papers by Gindling (1991), Pradhan & Van Soest 
(1995) and Funkhauser (1996) have examined the factors that determine the 
choice of individuals to work in the formal or informal sector in Brazil, 
Bolivia and Central America. However, these contributions are all based on 
the assumption that the individual will work exclusively either in the 
formal sector or in the informal sector.  
Consequently, this paper attempts, following the work of Theisen (2005), 
to complete the spirit of this literature. To the best of our knowledge, apart 
from this work which analyses the case of Tanzania, the participation 
functions explaining moonlighting have not been previously estimated in 
Africa. 
This article is organized into four sections. Section I establishes an 
econometric model consisting of two alternative specifications of the 
 
1 Glick (1999) uses an empirical approach based on the simultaneous Tobit model discussed 
by Amemiya (1974). 
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conditions for participating in moonlighting. The second section contains a 
presentation of the data used and a descriptive analysis of participation in 
moonlighting. Section III deals with the main estimated results. Section IV 
enables to conclude.  
 
2. Econometric model 
Assuming that an individual whose behaviour is guided by the utility 
function U (X, L), where X is the volume of Hicks' aggregate good, and L is 
leisure. This utility can be maximized under two constraints, that of goods 
and that of time. 
When the single price of the aggregate good is normalized to l, the 
constraint of the goods takes the following form  
𝑋 = 𝑉 + 𝑊𝑁 + 𝑍𝐹 𝐻  where V is non-wage income, W the formal wage 
rate, 𝑁  the hours of work in the formal sector, Z an index of productivity, H 
the time spent on domestic production and F(H) a function in which we 
suppose that F(0) = 0 and that F(H) is increasing and concaving in H2. In 
general, consumer goods can be financed from three sources: non-wage 
income (V), wage income and domestic production (ZF(H)). Domestic 
production is similar to that of Gronau (1977), and the model implies the 
assumption that domestic goods and goods purchased on the market are 
perfect substitutes in consumption. Factors of production other than 
domestic time such as capital, land, skills, etc. may affect the term Z in the 
domestic production function, but are not specified in the theoretical model 
(Theisen, 2005).  
The second restriction under which the individual maximizes his utility 
is the constraint of time, 𝐿 + 𝐻 + 𝑁 = 𝑇, where T is the total time available, 
with L, H and T not being all negative. Working time in the formal sector is 
assumed to be determined by labour market demand. Consequently, it is 
exogenous to the individual and indicated by 𝑁 . Moreover, we assume that 
the individual who wants a job in the formal sector must agree to work full 
time. This hypothesis is in line with the observation that part-time work in 
the formal sector is practically non-existent in Cameroon. 
The combination of these two constraints of good and time leads to the 
budget constraint. 
The problem of optimizing the consumption of this individual can then 
be defined as follows: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑈(𝑉 + 𝑊𝑁 + 𝑍𝐹 𝐻 ,𝑇 − 𝑁 − 𝐻  under the time 
constraint (H)3. 
The solution4 to this problem involves a trade-off between labour and 
leisure Thus, if the utility lost for one leisure hour is offset by the utility of 
an additional hour of in a moonlight job, the individual renounces leisure 
 
2 Indeed, the first and second derivatives of this function are respectively positive (FH > 0) 
and negative (FHH ≤ 0) 
3 The constraint H is given by 𝐻 = 𝑓 𝑊 𝑉  −𝑁  with 𝑊 = 𝑍𝐹𝐻(𝐻) with   the value of the 
marginal productivity of a moonlight job and Ṽ the income from a moonlight job. 
4 A two-step solution: the first one being the decision to participate in the moonlight job 
market, while the second is the decision about working time.  
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in favour of work. This is the case when the marginal productivity of the 
individual is greater than the expected wage (W * = UL/UX). 
Let us suppose that the real offer of participation in the moonlighting 
market is proportional to the hourly time allocated to such a production XH 
=ZH. The following equality emerges from this 𝑊 = 𝑊 = 𝑍  in which 𝑊  is 
the average rate of job wages. This average rate seems to be a restriction but 
it is in line with the hypothesis of exogeneity of the wage rate made in most 
studies on labour supply, in particular on moonlighting (Moffrtt, 1984; 
Ginding, l99l; Averett, 2001; Theisen, 2005). 
The utility function used to define the conditions for participation in 
moonlighting is as follows (Pencavel, 1986; Theisen, 2005):  
 
𝑈 𝑋,𝑋 + 𝑁 ;𝑅, 𝑒𝑢 = (
𝑦  𝐻+𝑁  − 𝑤
 𝑦  
2 )𝑒𝑥𝑝  
𝑦 ( 0+ 𝑦𝑋+
′
𝑅+𝑅
′
𝑄+ 𝑈
𝑦  𝐻+𝑁  − 𝑤
   (1) 
 
Where are 𝜔, (𝑖 = 0,𝑊 ,𝑉 ) individual parameters5, 𝜔′𝑅 ,𝜔′𝑄 are vectors of 
parameters and 𝑈 is the stochastic error term. This error term can be 
interpreted as a taste known to the worker but unknown to the employer. 
But we assume that 𝑈~𝑁(0,𝜎𝑈
2). R and Q are column vectors of taste 
changes known to both the worker and the employer. 
The calculation of the partial derivatives enables us to find the marginal 
rate of substitution of labour for leisure which corresponds to the structural 
form of participation in moonlight jobs as follows:  
 
𝑈𝑥 =  
𝜔𝑦  𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
 𝑤𝑦  
2   
 𝜔𝑦  
2
𝜔𝑦  𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑦
 𝑒𝑥𝑝  
𝜔𝑦 (𝜔0+𝜔𝑦𝑋+𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄+𝜔𝑤
𝜔𝑦  𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝  
𝜔𝑦 (𝜔0+𝜔𝑦𝑋+𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔′𝑄𝑄+𝜔𝑤
𝜔𝑦  𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑌     (2) 
 
      Knowing that; 
 𝐻 + 𝑁  = 𝑇 − 𝐿 
 𝑈𝐿
=  
−𝜔𝑦
 𝑤𝑦 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑌
+  
𝜔𝑦 𝐻 + 𝑁  − 𝜔𝑦
 𝜔𝑦 
2   
((𝜔𝑦 𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑤𝑋 + 𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅 + 𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄 + 𝑦 −𝜔𝑤 )𝜔𝑦
(𝜔𝑦 𝐻 + 𝑁  − 𝜔𝑤 )
2
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑌 
𝑈𝐿 = − 
 𝐻+𝑁  −(𝜔0+𝜔𝑉𝑋+𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄+ 𝑈
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑌     (3) 
 
So, 
 
 
5  In fact, 𝑉 − 𝑉 + 𝑊𝑁 +𝑍𝐹 𝐻 −𝑊  𝑁 + 𝐻 = 𝑉 +  𝑍𝐹 𝐻 −𝑊 𝐻 +  𝑊−𝑊  𝑁 = 𝑉 +
 
𝑍𝐹 𝐻 
𝐻
−𝑊  𝐻 +  𝑊−𝑊  𝑁 = 𝑉 + 𝑊   −𝑊 )𝐻 + (𝑊−𝑊 )𝑁  where 𝑊 = 𝑍𝐹𝐻(𝐻)/𝐻 is the 
moonlight job average rate? With 𝑊 = 𝑊  , the term  𝑊 −𝑊  𝐻  disappears from the 
expression 𝑉 which implies some adjustments in the constraint H. 
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𝑈𝐿
𝑈 𝑋
=
− 
 𝐻+𝑁  −(𝜔0+𝜔𝑉𝑋+𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄+ 𝑈
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑌
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑌
=  
 𝐻+𝑁  −(𝜔0+𝜔𝑉𝑋+𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄+ 𝑈
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
  (4) 
 
 
However, the linear equation of domestic production enables us to 
write: 𝑍 = 𝑊 = 𝑊  
 
𝑋 = 𝑉 + 𝑊𝑁 + 𝑍𝐻 = 𝑉 + 𝑊𝑁 + 𝑊 𝑁 + 𝑊 𝐻 −𝑊 𝐻 + 𝑊 𝑁 + 𝑍 = 𝑉 +
𝐻 𝑊 −𝑊  + 𝑁  𝑊 −𝑊  + 𝑊 𝐻 + 𝑊 𝑁      (5) 
 
By replacing (5) in (4) we get: 
 
𝑈𝐿
𝑈 𝑋
= − 
 𝐻+𝑁  −(𝜔0+𝜔𝑉(𝑉 +𝑊 𝐻+𝑊 𝑁 )+𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄+ 𝑈
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
 =
 
(𝜔0+𝜔𝑉𝑉 +𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻+𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻+𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝑁 +𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅+𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄+ 𝑈−𝐻−𝑁 
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻+𝑁  −𝜔𝑤
     (6) 
 
 
But the first order condition of participation in the moonlight labour 
market gives us, 
 
𝑈𝐿
𝑈 𝑋
= 𝑊 = 𝑍𝐹𝐻(𝐻) 
 
Which enables us to write: 
 
 
(𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑉𝑉 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝑁 + 𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅 + 𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄 + 𝑈 −𝐻 −𝑁 
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻 + 𝑁  − 𝜔𝑤
 = 𝑊 ; 
𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑉𝑉 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝑁 + 𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅 + 𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄 + 𝑈 −𝐻 −𝑁 
= 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝑁 − 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊  
 
Hence the following moonlight employment participation function: 
 
ℎ ℎ𝐻 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑉𝑉 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 + 𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅 + 𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄 − 𝑁 + 𝑈       (7) 
 
For non-participants in moonlight jobs, ℎ ℎ𝐻 = 0,𝑊 = 𝑍𝐹𝐻(0). 
Knowing that the marginal rate of substitution of moonlight work for 
leisure must be positive for participants and negative or zero for non-
participants, we can write the condition below: 
 
 
𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑉𝑉 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝐻 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 𝑁 + 𝜔
′
𝑅𝑅 + 𝜔
′
𝑄𝑄 − 𝐻 − 𝑁 + 𝑈
(𝜔𝑉 𝐻 + 𝑁  − 𝜔𝑤
  
≤ (𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐻 = 0 
>  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐻 > 0 
   
 
For an individual k in the structural form of participation in a moonlight 
job, it is: 
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𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑉𝑉 
𝑘 + 𝜔𝑉𝑊 
𝑘 + 𝜔𝑅𝑅 
𝑘 + 𝜔′𝑄𝑄
𝑘 −𝑁𝑘    + 𝑢
𝑘  
≤0    𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐻=0
>0    𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐻>0
    (8) 
 
It is assumed that the error term 𝑢
𝑘  is distributed according to a reduced 
centred normal distribution rule and therefore relationship (8) constitutes a 
variant of the probit model. 
To derive the reduced form of participation in moonlight employment, 
we first specify the earnings function of the moonlight job sector of the type 
introduced by Mincer (1974) as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑊 𝑘 = 𝜂 + 𝜌𝑠
′ 𝑆𝑘 + 𝜌𝑠
′𝑄𝑘 + 𝐸
𝑘         (9) 
 
 
Where 𝑊 𝑘  is the hourly wage rate for moonlight jobs, ŋ the constant, P’S 
and P’Q are the column vectors of parameters, Sk is a column vector of the 
explanatory variables included in the earnings function but not in the 
utility function and Qk the column vector of the explanatory variables 
included in both the earnings function and in changes in the taste of the 
earnings function. 𝐸
𝑘  is the stochastic error term assumed to follow a 
reduced centred normal law ( 𝐸
𝑘~𝑁 0,𝜎𝐸
2 ) and that 𝐸
𝑘  is not correlated to 
the error term of the condition of participation in moonlight jobs, i.e.  
The reduced form is therefore the following: 
 
𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑉𝑉 
𝑘 + 𝜔𝑅𝑅 
𝑘 + 𝜔 𝑠𝑆
𝑘 −𝜔𝑄𝑄
𝑘 +  𝑘  
≤0    ≤0 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑛𝑜𝑛 −𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (𝐻=0)
>0    >0 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (𝐻>0)
   (10) 
 
With k = 1,2…, K 
Where 𝑉 𝑘 = (𝑉𝑘 + 𝑊𝑘𝑁 𝑘  is the exogenous income 𝑤 0 = (𝜔0 +
( 𝜔𝑤 −𝜔𝑣  𝜂 − 1)𝑁 
𝑘 , 
 
𝜔 𝑠
′ = ( 𝜔𝑤 −𝜔𝑣  𝜌𝑠
′𝑁 𝑘), 
𝜔 𝑄
′ = ( 𝜔𝑤 −𝜔𝑣  𝜌𝑄
′ 𝑁 𝑘 + 𝜔𝑄
′ ),  and 
 𝑄
𝑘 = ( 𝜔𝑤 −𝜔𝑣  𝑁 
𝑘
𝐸
𝑘 + 𝑈
𝑘  
 
As the expressions 𝜔 0 ,𝜔 𝑠
′  and 𝜔 𝑄
′ are functions of 𝑁 𝑘 , it is obvious that 
the participation condition given by equation 10 contains explanatory 
variables correlated with the error term   𝑘 . Consequently, a good estimate 
of the parameters of the scale form of the equation would not be possible. 
Note, however, that in principle part-time work is not practiced in the 
formal sector in Cameroon. For this purpose, it is reasonable to impose the 
restriction 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘. The terms 𝜔 0 ,𝜔 𝑠
′  and 𝜔 𝑄
′  thus become constants and 
the correlation between the error term and the other terms given in the 
condition of the equation l0 no longer exist. In addition, the term                   
and the constant 𝜔 0 which appear separately in equation 8 are included in 
the constant 𝑁 𝑘  of equation 10. This fusion of the constant and the original 
constant enable to avoid multicollinearity. 
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As in the work of Theisen (2005), our solution to the absence of data on 
virtual wages leads to a cost. Indeed, in the estimation of our model, we 
can only identify the parameters of the scale form (𝜔 0 ,𝜔𝑣 ,𝜔𝑅
′ ,𝜔𝑆
′ ,𝜔𝑄
′ ) and 
(𝜔𝑣 ,𝜔𝑅
′ ) . Only two of these parameters 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘  are those of the 
structural function of participation in moonlighting and of the utility 
function. Overall, the restriction 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘  enables us to make a coherent 
estimate of the parameters of the scale equation for participation in 
moonlighting, just as it makes it possible for us to identify the impact of 
hourly time on participation in the main job. 
For those not participating in moonlight jobs, the labour supply given by 
equation 10 is negative and can be interpreted as a latent supply (𝐻1) while 
it is positive for the participants. The variable (𝐻1) enables us to define a 
binary indicator (𝐻 .
𝑘)  which takes the value 1 if the individual k 
participates in a secondary job and 0 in the opposite case.  
Which leads to the participation model: 
 
𝐻 .
𝑘 =  
0   𝑖𝑓    𝐻.
𝑘    ≤0
1   𝑖𝑓    𝐻.
𝑘    >0
    𝑘 = 1,2,… ,𝐾        (11) 
 
Because the error terms of Equations 8 and 9 follow a scale centred 
normal law,  
With 𝐸 𝑈
𝑘
𝐸
𝑘 = 0  ∀𝑘 the error term in Equation 10 also follows a scale 
centred normal law. Moreover, the restriction 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘 makes it possible 
to conclude that the statistical distribution of the error term will be identical 
for all workers. The binary indicator of equation 11 therefore represents a 
standard probit model for which the error term is assumed to follow a scale 
centred normal law  𝐸
𝑘~𝑁 0,1 𝑘.                      
The phenomenon of endogenization of the salary of the main job can be 
specified as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑊 𝑘 = 𝜂 + 𝜌𝑠
′ 𝑆𝑘 + 𝜌𝑠
′𝑄𝑘 + 𝐸
𝑘         (12) 
 
But participation in a moonlighting is influenced by the characteristics of 
the main job and particularly the wages in the main job6. We can thus write: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑘 = 𝑋𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑖  
 
Where  𝑋𝑖1   is a vector of instruments, 𝛽1  the vector of associated 
parameters to estimate and 𝛿𝑖 the error term. The error terms 𝐸
𝑘 ,𝛿  are 
assumed to follow a bivariate normal law with 0 as an average and as a 
variance– covariance matrix:  
 
𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑘 = 𝑋𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑖         (13) 
 
6 As a rule, the higher the salary of the main job, the more reluctant the individual will be to 
engage in moonlighting in favor of leisure; and the lower this salary, the more he invests 
himself in moonlighting to the detriment of leisure... 
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We set 𝐸 𝛿2 = 1  to ensure the identity of the model while p is the 
correlation coefficient of the error terms. 
The control vector Xo includes all the variables likely to influence the 
moonlight job wage (education, professional experience, sex, parents' 
education, marital status, age, sector of activities…). The vector X1 includes 
the determinants of the main job (wage). 
We can use the following multinomial probit model for estimating the 
parameter vector 𝛽𝑖𝑗 : 
 
𝑃𝑗 =
exp ⁡(𝛽𝑗𝑍)
1+ exp ⁡(𝛽𝑗𝑍)𝐽=1,2
   (𝐽 = 1,2)      (14) 
 
Where Pj is the probability that a worker is in sector j, Z is a vector of 
covariances and where the private sector coefficient vector βo is normalized 
to 0 (Green, 2000). 
The output of this multinomial probit model is used to estimate the 
following selection term for the moonlight job earnings function: 
 
𝑇 =
φ[J 𝛽𝑗𝑍 ]
φ 𝛽𝑗𝑍 
           (15) 
 
Where φ is the normal distribution density function N(0,1) and φ is the 
cumulative function of the normal law. 
Introducing this selection term into equation (12) gives us the following 
gain function: 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑊 𝑘 = 𝜂 + 𝜌𝑠
′ 𝑆𝑘 + 𝛾𝑇𝑘 + 𝜌𝑄
′ 𝑄𝑘 + 𝐸
′      (16) 
 
Where 𝛾  is a parameter to be estimated and the error term is 
𝐸
𝑘~𝑁 0,1 𝑘. 
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis of participation in 
secondary employment 
The second Cameroonian Household Survey (ECAM2), carried out in 
2001 among 10,992 households, about 56,924 individuals, made it possible 
to collect information relating not only to main employment but also and 
above all to moonlighting. Taking into account the sensitivity of the field of 
wages and the reluctance of individuals to give reliable information on 
their earnings, our sample is 3,387 workers with a main job and a 
moonlight job, and whose age is between 15 and 65 years. 
Data relating to the practice of moonlighting in Cameroon can be 
characterized by essential variables including the salary of the main job, the 
salary of the moonlight job, age, professional experience in the main job, 
the individual's working time in both jobs (taking into account that there is 
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no part-time work in the main job) and the level of education. The statistics 
for these variables are presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Average characteristics of workers in moonlight jobs 
Variables Average 
Age 37.567 (0.201) 
Professional experience 12.639 (0.191) 
Education 11.070 (0.077) 
Main job salary 45891.68 (1785.255) 
Moonlight job wages 25546.76 (2.832) 
Number of working hours 162.201 (1.348) 
Source: ECAM 2, 2001. 
 
We can notice that workers in moonlight jobs have fairly low average 
wage levels both in the main job and in the secondary job. "An average of 
FCFA 45,891.68 for the main job with a very high standard deviation which 
reflects a non-homogeneity of these wages, and an average of FCFA 
25,546.76 for moonlight job. These average low wages are accompanied by 
a fairly low average level of education (11.070 years of study) which pushes 
to infer that the individuals who get involved in moonlighting are 
overwhelmingly secondary school graduates. However, it should be noted 
that the average professional experience (12.639 years), age (37.567 years) is 
rather high; this is also the case of working time whose average weekly 
number of hours is 40.5. The following matrix shows the correlations 
between the different variables. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 EXP AGE EDUC NHT SPA SPR SEP SES 
EXP 1        
AGE 0.628 1       
EDUC -0.312 -0.148 1      
NHT -0.024 -0.014 0.055 1     
SPA -0.024 0.030 0.108 4.072 1    
SPR -0.013 -0.074 -0.380 -0.037 -0.414 1   
SEP 0.049 0.071 0.235 0.099 0.075 -0.187 1  
SES 0.048 0.051 -0.033 0.062 0.018 -0.074 0.122 1 
Source: ECAM 2, 2001. 
 
This table shows that the correlation between education and 
professional experience on the one hand, working time and professional 
experience on the other hand is negative. This reflects the fact that the more 
educated individuals have little professional experience compared to those 
of workers whose level of education is less and less high; the more 
experienced they are, the more they work for a very limited time in the 
moonlight job site. The correlation between the salary of the moonlight job 
and professional experience, age, working time, the practice of this job in 
the para-public sector and the salary of the main job is positive while it is 
negative both for education and moonlight job in the private sector. The 
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salary of the main job shows a positive correlation with all the variables, 
except the one which shows holding a moonlight job in the private sector. 
 
3. Empirical results 
We believe it is possible to present the results of the incidence of 
variables linked to education, professional experience, age, marital status 
and sector of activity on the main job salary of workers who practice 
multiactivity before dealing with their influence on the wages of moonlight 
jobs. Table 3 below gives the results of the estimates in the formal and 
informal sectors and in general. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of earnings functions of the main job depending on the formal and 
informal sectors 
Variables Formal sector Informal sector General 
Constant 
8.377* 9.252* 9.852* 
(0.416) (0.292) (0.228) 
Education 
0.038* 0.008* 0.014*** 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) 
Age 
0.073* 0.017** 0.025* 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.007) 
Age square 
-0.0009* -0.0001*** -0.0002* 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.00009) 
Professional experience 
0.025* 0.001 0.004 
(0.018) (0.004) (0.003) 
Square of professional 
experience 
-0.0004 -0.00003 -0.00004 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.00009) 
Working time 
0.0007* 0.001* 0.001* 
(0.0002) 0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public sector 
0.185 - 0.255** 
0.126  (0.136) 
Para-public sector 
0.161*** - 0.206*** 
(0.083)  (0.105) 
Private sector 
0.255* -0.389* 0.557* 
(0.052) (0.122) (0.053) 
No diploma 
0.060 0.095 0.342** 
(0.210) (0.217) (0.140) 
CEP / FSLC 
0.111 0.014 0.269** 
(0.152) (0.195) (0.112) 
BEPC/CAP/GCEOL 
0.254** 0.166 0.018 
(0.120) (0.194) (0.102) 
Probatoire/BP 
0.309** 0.098 0.042 
(0.132) (0.237) (0.126) 
BAC/GCEAL/BEP 
0.222** 0.360*** 0.149 
(0.104) (0.210) (0.10.3) 
Higher education diploma 
0.614* 1.118* 0.831* 
(0.150) (0.278) (0.149) 
Single 
-0.057 -0.155** -0.072 
(0.099) (0.073) (0.061) 
Monogamous 
0.051 0.038 0.007 
(0.094) (0.066) (0.056) 
Polygamous 
0.076 0.075 0.086 
(0.108) (0.072) (0.061) 
Religion -0.014 0.039* 0.028* 
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(0.016) (0.011) (0.009) 
R2 adjusted 0.696 0.396 0.051 
Number of observations 773 2614 3387 
Source: ECAM 2, 2001. 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses; * coefficient significant at the 100% threshold, 
** significant coefficient at the 50% threshold, *** significant coefficient at the 10% threshold. 
 
The results presented above enable us to make several essential remarks. 
Education has a positive influence on the salary of the main job in both the 
formal and informal sectors and in general. This influence is more 
important and significant in the formal sector while it is not significant in 
the informal sector. Likewise, the older the worker, the more his wages 
increase, but at a decreasing rate. However, it should be noted that the 
influence of age on wages is also more significant in the formal sector. 
Professional experience contributes to account for the increase in the salary 
of the main job in both sectors but also at a decreasing rate. 
The business sector does not have the same influence on wages in the 
formal and informal sectors. This influence is more significant in the 
private sector and particularly in the informal sector which offers a greater 
contribution to account for wages than that of the formal sector. The level 
of the diploma is on average positively correlated with the salary of the 
main job. In other words, as the level of the diploma increases, its 
contribution to account for the salary increases on average. The influence of 
marital status on the salary of the main job is positive depending on 
whether the worker is monogamous or polygamous, but negative 
depending on whether he is single. On the other hand, religion positively 
and significantly influences the salary of the main job in the informal sector 
but negatively in the formal sector. 
Before examining the interpretation of the results of our estimates, note 
that our model predicts a negative coefficient of the wage income variable 
of the main job, given the assumption that leisure is a normal good. An 
estimate of the results of the participation equation based on Equation 10 is 
given by Table 4 below. The estimate of the participation equation shows 
that ten variables (main job salary, education, working time, no diploma, 
CEP/FSLC, BAC/GCEAL/BEP, single, monogamous, polygamous and 
religion) are significantly different from zero to 5% or more. 
In the same light, before giving the interpretation of our results in detail, 
we intend to return to the restriction 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘 and the assumptions made 
about the motivations for participation in moonlight job. 
Speaking of the restriction 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘 it must be said that if it is not 
valid, the results of our estimations could not be consistent. A careful look 
at our data reveals that 76.67% of individuals in our sample have a working 
time different from the normal time of 8 hours per day7. This deviation is 
too high, which is evidence that the estimates A, B and C are not weak 
enough. However, to assess the effect of the variation in working time on 
 
7 443 people work 5 hours a day, 480 work 6 hours, 232 work 9 hours, 354 work 10 hours. 
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the results of our estimates, we proceed to a new estimate of the 
participation equation using only the sub-sample of 790 individuals 
working for exactly 8 hours and therefore respecting the restriction. The 
results of this estimate are presented in column D of Table 4 below. A 
Student's test comparing the respective coefficients of the variables in 
columns C and D shows that some coefficients (Age, BEPC / CAP / GCEOL, 
Probatoire/BP and higher education diploma) are statistically different at 
the conventional significance thresholds. We can therefore conclude that 
failure to comply with the restriction on the number of normal working 
hours 𝑁 𝑘 = 𝑁  ∀𝑘 has major consequences on the results of our estimates. 
Statistics from our sample reveal that 50.66% of workers are under-
employed (less than 8 working hours per day) in their main job while 26% 
are over-employed (more than 8 working hours per day). In this sense, we 
can estimate anew the specific moonlight job participation equation using a 
sub-sample of under-employed workers on the one hand and a sub-sample 
of over-employed workers on the other in their main job. The respective 
results are presented in columns C and D. The Student test comparing the 
coefficients of columns A and C of Table 4 shows that four coefficients 
(Age, square of age, BEPC / CAP / GCEOL, Probatoire / BP) are statistically 
different at the conventional significance thresholds. On the other hand, the 
application of the same test of the coefficients between the coefficients in 
columns A and D shows that no coefficient is statistically different from the 
conventional significance thresholds. So, we can conclude that those 
workers who are under-employed have obvious motivations to participate 
in moonlight jobs while some who are over-employed have no obvious 
motivation to participate in moonlight jobs. Consequently, we can say that 
Cameroonians seem to participate in moonlight jobs mainly because they 
are partly rational (especially those who are under-employed) and partly 
irrational in their choices (especially those who are over-employed). While 
it is true that a working day in Cameroon lasts approximately as long as 
that of developed countries, we can think that it is obvious that workers are 
more motivated to participate in secondary jobs compared to industrialized 
countries. It is somewhat paradoxical that the number of working hours 
per day differs very little between countries with extremely different per 
capita incomes. In practice in Cameroon, a large majority of workers 
(50.66%) work fewer hours than the norm against a minority (26%) who 
work beyond the daily hourly norm. Only 23.34% of individuals work for a 
normal duration, that is to say 8 hours per day. All these estimates are 
summarized in Table 4 below: 
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Table 4. Estimates of the bivariate structural probit model of moonlight jobs decision-making 
Variables A B C D 
Constant 
-2.673* -0.163 1.105* -0.301 
(0.675) (0.584) 0.491 ‘0.483) 
Main job salary 
0.331* 0.000001* 0.0000005* 0.0000001 
(0.065) (0.0000003) (0.000002) (0.0000001) 
Education 
-0.022* -0.042* -0.024* -0.007 
(0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) 
Age 
0.010 0.025*** 0.016** 0.012 
(0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) 
Age square 
-0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002** -0.0009 
(0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Professional experience 
-0.001 0.008 0.003 0.001 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
Square of professional experience 
0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0004 
(0.00007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Woman 
-0.017** -0.003* 0.026** -0.031 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
Working time 
0.000001* 0.001 0.0009* 0.0001 
(0.0000003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Para-public sector 
-0.036 0.063 -0.154 -0.003 
(0.025) (0.123) (0.239) (0.187) 
Private sector 
0.073 -0.081 -0.175 0.144 
(0.086) (0.121) (0.234) (0.122) 
No diploma 
-0.210*** -0.461 -0.575* *0.131 
(0.123) (0.093) (0.175) (1.002) 
CEP/FSLC 
-0.241** 0.151*** -0.612* -0.004 
(0.098) (0.093) (0.144) (0.077) 
BEPC/CAP/GCEOL 
-0.114 0.461* -0.406* 0.074 
(0.088) (0.150) (0.134) (0.132) 
Probatoire/BP 
-0.122 0.353*** -0.328*** 0.318 
(0.108) (0.199) (0.170) (0.212) 
BAC/GCEAL/BEP 
-0.203** 0.285 -0.405* 0.309 
(0.089) (0.194) (0.136) (0.182) 
Higher education diploma 
0.045 0.432*** 0.051 0.141 
(0.141) (0.250) (0.957) (0.226) 
Single 
0.167* 0.290** 0.124*** 0.077 
(0.053) (0.117) (0.071) (0.101) 
Monogamous 
0.103** 0.188*** 0.131** 0.012 
(0.048) (0.106) (0.064) (0.095) 
Polygamous 
0.156* 0.328* 0.182* 0.153 
(0.053) (0.114) (0.069) (0.105) 
Religion 
0.026* 0.033** 0.042* 0.029** 
(0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) 
Formal sector 
0.184 0.116 -0.105 0.600 
(0.221) (0.450) (0.350) (0.377) 
Informal sector 
0.078 0.130 -0.195 0.416 
(0.221) (0.453) (0.349) (0.378) 
R2 adjusted 0.044 0.028 0.050 0.044 
Number of observations 3387 790 1716 881 
Source: ECAM 2.2041. 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses; * coefficient significant at the level of l%; ** 
significant coefficient at the 5% level; *** coefficient significant at the 10% level. 
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A: Together; B = Individuals working 8 hours in the main job and having 
a moonlight job; C: individuals working for less than 8 hours in the main 
job and having a moonlight job; D: Individuals working for more than 8 
hours in the main job and having a moonlight job. 
In all the estimates of the equations given in Table 4 above, all the 
coefficients of the main job wage variable are statistically significant and 
positive except that of the category of individuals working more than eight 
hours per day which is positive but not significant (column D). The latter 
case has the lowest coefficient, which is evidence that such individuals who 
spend less time in their moonlight job earn less than workers in estimates B 
and C. 
The education variable, which is a component of human capital, shows a 
weak negative link with participation in moonlight job, but statistically 
significant in the estimates A, B and C. The nature of the coefficient of the 
estimate D shows that the more the worker is educated, the less he works 
for more than eight hours in the main job and participates less in the 
secondary job.  
In all the estimates of our participation equations, all the coefficients of 
the age variable are positive but only those of the estimates B and C are 
statistically significant. All things being equal, this relationship shows that 
individuals are likely to participate in moonlight jobs as their age increases. 
This positive relationship between participation in moonlight job and age is 
confirmed by the positive relationship between participation and work 
experience. This last relationship is in agreement with the interpretation 
that age is a measure of human capital acquired through experience. This is 
also in line with the results obtained by Pradhan & Van Soest (1995) in 
Bolivia, Dasgupta (2003) in India & Theisen (2005) in Tanzania. 
Another explanation for the positive relationship between age and 
participation in moonlight jobs may be that Cameroonians have a strong 
incentive to engage in moonlight jobs as they approach retirement age due 
to the fact that retirement pensions are very insufficient to cover the cost of 
living during retirement. 
The female gender weakly and negatively accounts for participation in a 
moonlight job on the whole (estimate A) but its coefficient is significantly 
negative. The same is true for the estimate of individuals working eight 
hours per day in the main job. But, for those individuals working more 
than eight hours a day, the effect on participation is negative and 
statistically insignificant. Having a positive coefficient for the female 
variable for individuals working for less than eight hours seems to reflect 
the fact that the participation of women in moonlight jobs is only possible 
when they work for a relatively short time in their main job. 
Working time is a weak but positive explanation for participation in 
moonlight jobs. Its coefficients are significant overall and in the estimate C 
for individuals working less than eight hours per day. 
The survey shows that the practice of multiple jobs does not exist in the 
public sector but rather in the para-public and especially the private 
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sectors. The coefficients of the para-public sector variable are all negative 
and not significant except that of individuals working for eight hours per 
day which is positive. This seems to reflect the fact that workers are subject 
to a discipline of scrupulous respect for working time. The private sector, 
for its part, although presenting a non-significant coefficient, shows that 
individuals participate in moonlight jobs although they probably work 
more than eight hours a day, as shown by the importance of the coefficient 
of the estimate D (0.144).  
The effect of a diploma on participation in moonlight jobs is varied. Our 
estimates show that the more the individual is educated, the more he 
participates in moonlight jobs. One explanation for this result is certainly to 
be found in the relatively low levels of remuneration of workers in their 
main job according to their diplomas, as shown by Manga Engama (2006).  
Marital status accounts for almost participation in moonlight jobs in an 
almost identical way. Whether one is single, monogamous or polygamous, 
the participation coefficients are all positive and statistically significant for 
those who work eight hours and less than eight hours per day. Although 
positive, these coefficients are quite low and not significant, relevant for 
those who work more than eight hours a day. 
In our estimates, all the coefficients of the religion variable are positive 
and statistically significant, which is evidence that religion is a determinant 
of participation in a moonlight job. 
Participation in moonlight jobs in the formal or informal sector has a 
negative correlation with working less than eight hours a day, but the 
coefficients are positive and quite high for those who work for eight hours 
and especially those who work for more than eight hours (0.600 and 0.4l6 
respectively for the formal and informal sectors). 
 
4. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, apart from sectorial work by Yamb & 
Bikoue (2016, 2019), no study has ever been carried out in Cameroon on the 
estimation of the functions of participation in moonlighting. Our study 
thus aims at analysing the phenomenon of moonlighting and broadening 
the scope of the literature on the issue, especially in the African context. 
This article focuses on individuals who have two jobs, including a main job 
and a moonlight job, the latter falling within the para-public sector or the 
private sector (formal or informal) since the survey does not reveal any 
moonlight job in the public sector. 
Our empirical results imply that leisure is a normal good insofar as the 
fall in the salary of an individual's main job despite his experience can be 
compensated by participation in a moonlight job. Like the informal sector 
in Fields (1975), moonlight jobs play a role of buffer employment.  
Our estimates show that the main job wage, age, working time, higher 
education qualification, marital status, religion, formal sector and informal 
sector have a positive effect on participation in moonlight jobs while 
education, the para-public sector and the female gender have the opposite 
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effect. We can notice that participation in a moonlight job increases with the 
salary of the main job and with age, contrary to what is traditionally 
postulated by economic theory (Averret, 2001; Lacroix & Fortin, 1992; 
Shiskho & Rostker, 1976).  
The positive correlation between the salary of the main job and 
participation in the moonlight job, apparently contradictory, seems to be 
explained by the low levels of wages resulting from the salary drop of 
January and November 1993 in Cameroon, aggravated by the devaluation 
of January 1994. In order to maintain their standard of living, workers are 
therefore inclined to find additional income through secondary jobs. 
While in developed countries, particularly in the United States, age 
negatively affects participation in moonlighting (Rostker & Sishko, 1977; 
Conway & Kimmel, 1998; Averett, 2001), in Cameroon as well as in 
Tanzania (Theisen, 2005 it is the opposite effect that has been noticed. One 
possible explanation for these results may probably be related to 
differences in retirement pension systems. In the case of Cameroon and 
probably other developing countries participation in moonlight jobs 
appears to be a "substitute "to the failures of the retirement pension system. 
Indeed, the salary being low and the pension being only a fraction of this 
salary, the level of retirement pension also remains very low, hence the 
need for the individual to find additional income to meet their needs. 
Conversely, in developed countries such as the United States, the negative 
impact of age on participation in moonlighting suggests that the worker, 
when approaching retirement age, withdraws first from the moonlight job, 
and then from the main job. Research subsequent to this article may place 
particular emphasis on employment during retirement in developing 
countries in general and in the African context in particular. 
In view of the rampant unemployment which is gaining ground in the 
Cameroonian economy, it would be important to set up an incentive 
framework for work in the jobs (health insurance, aid for the education of 
workers’ children, performance bonuses, attendance bonuses, 
punctuality...) in order to limit the participation of workers in moonlighting 
and give job-seekers a better chance of finding a job.  
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